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Abstract
What actions do governments around the world take that may affect individuals’
trust in the government that positively influence tax morale (or a positive attitude
toward tax compliance)? This paper researches which are the most salient
government institutions that breed individual trust and the extent to which this trust
ends up increasing citizens’ tax morale. We use cross-country survey information
from the World Values Survey and the Freedom House spanning 92 countries and
six survey waves during the period 1981-2014. Conditional on the level of political
rights and civil liberties, we confirm prior evidence that trust in government
organizations positively influences tax morale. More importantly, our findings
show that it is trust in output government organizations that implement and deliver
public goods and services to the citizenry that has a significantly larger impact on
tax morale as compared to citizens’ trust in input-side organizations, such as the
legislative and the executive branches of the government that design policy. We
also exploit periods of democratic transitions, when large variations in trust may be
present, to assess the role of trust in government organizations for tax morale using
a treatment effects model. Our results reveal a robust, positive impact of negative
democratic transitions on tax morale.
Keywords: Tax morale, tax compliance, trust in government, government
institutions, democratic transition, World Values Survey
JEL classification: H26, K42
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1. Introduction
Does trust in government organizations influence individuals’ tax morale?1 If so, is it trust
in political institutions (input side) or administrative government organizations (output side) that
matters the most? And does variation in political rights and civil liberties due to democratic
transitions affect these relationships? These are important questions as it is not entirely clear what
is that government does to successfully elicit taxpayers’ trust. In this paper we draw from the recent
literature on social capital and institutional trust which highlights that treating trust in different
government institutions similarly, as in a general “trust in government,” glosses over the different
ways by which citizens come to trust distinct government institutions (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).2
We distinguish between organizations on the output side of government such as those charged
with delivering civil services or policing as well as the courts and the input side of government,
which includes the political organizations of government such as the legislative and the executive
branches of the government that design policy.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (“AS”) provided the theoretical underpinnings for an
answer to why individuals pay their taxes based on deterrence motives (Becker, 1968). However,
lab and field experiments indicate that the average level of taxpayer compliance would appear to
exceed what the AS model would predict based on the actual probabilities of audit and effective
penalties (Alm et al., 2010). In addition, the model’s exclusive reliance on pecuniary incentives
overlooks voluntary tax compliance (Feld and Frey, 2002, 2007).3

Tax morale has been defined as voluntary compliance with tax laws, an “umbrella term capturing nonpecuniary
motivations for tax compliance” such as intrinsic motivations, social or cultural norms, and departures from the
behaviors predicted by the expected utility framework (Torgler, 2006; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).
2
As is customary in the tax morale literature, we measure “trust in government” using World Values Survey
responses to “how much confidence” in different government branches do individual have (Daude et al., 2013).
3
Voluntary compliance may be also affected by the authorities’ behavior. For example, taxpayers may read
authorities’ increased reliance on penalties and audits as a sign that they are not trusted, and thus choose to
reciprocate authorities’ mistrust by evading their taxes instead of increasing their compliance (Bowles 2008).
1

1

The limitations of the AS model have prompted the search for extensions that may better
capture the complexity of tax compliant behavior (Alm, 1999; Alm and Torgler, 2011; Slemrod,
2007). From a theoretical angle, some research has focused on the role of norms, social customs
and group conformity to account for the potential moral costs incurred by taxpayers arising from
any deviation from the underlying norm (Myles and Naylor, 1996; Schnellenbach, 2006). In the
same spirit, Traxler (2010) incorporates tax morale into the AS model as a social norm towards
tax compliance. This gives rise to a societal interdependence as the optimal taxpayer behavior is
conditional on another taxpayers’ compliance. Taxpayers may comply with their taxes because
they feel tax compliance is a duty, which in turn increases the moral costs of engaging in tax
cheating (Cyan et al., 2016; Scholz and Pinney, 1995). In turn, the duty to comply with one’s tax
payments may increase when taxes decrease (Scholz and Lubell, 1998a), or when taxpayers trust
government and other taxpayers to hold onto their side of the tax contract (Scholz and Lubell,
1998b). This fits with the more general perspective of the role of norms in society as guiding
individual behavior and reducing uncertainty in exchange (North, 1994). Thus, norms would seem
to act as devices helping individuals to make their own tax compliance decisions (Torgler, 2003b).
As a consequence, instead of a single model of taxpayer behavior, we can expect a diversity of
behaviors (Torgler, 2003b; Alm, 1999). With regards to the sensitivity to social norms, some
individuals may be affected by what others around them think (or do) regarding compliance with
taxes (Frey and Torgler, 2007), and comply or evade on the basis of what others say or do (Litina
and Palivos, 2016).4 In this regard, using a randomized survey experiment, Doerrenberg and Peichl
(2018) find that a statement about tax evasion rates in society can actually backfire by effectively

4

Because tax compliance can be interpreted to be quasi-voluntary (Levi, 1998; Braithwaite, 2003), individuals may
also learn social norms on compliance (Ostrom, 1998).

2

decreasing tax morale. Although there is still limited evidence of a causal link between tax
compliance attitudes and actual tax compliant behavior (Halla, 2011), an increasing list of
empirical findings show plausibly that tax morale may influence taxpayer behavior (Torgler,
2002b; Alm and Torgler, 2006, Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Cummings et al., 2009; Koumpias
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2019).5
In this paper we seek two main goals: to bring more clarity on what form of trust in
government positively affects tax morale, and how the interaction of trust in government and the
manner in which government power is actually exercised may jointly influence tax morale (Alm
and Torgler, 2006, Chan et al., 2017; Cyan et al., 2016; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009;
Slemrod, 2003; Torgler 2003b, 2005a, 2005b). Empirically we employ individual survey
information from the World Values Survey (WVS) covering 92 countries in six waves that
intermittently span a total of 30 years from 1981 to 2014 with a lapse of coverage from 1985 till
1988. We test four hypotheses: (H1) whether trust in government positively affects tax morale:
(H2) which types of government organizations specifically are most salient in increasing tax
morale; (H3) what is the direct impact of positive and negative democratic transitions
(respectively, enhancing and undermined political rights and civil liberties) on tax morale; and (iv)
how does democratic transition condition the impact of trust on different types government
organizations.
The main contribution of this work is the extension of our understanding on how trust in
different types of government organizations influences tax morale and how those effects may be
conditioned in situations of democratic transition.

5

Recent clinical evidence based on a physiological marker also points towards a potential link between social norms
and tax compliance. Dulleck et al. (2016) proxy psychic costs through a measure of heart rate variability and find a
positive association between psychic stress and tax compliance.

3

Empirically, we find that trust in government organizations increase the probability of
reporting high tax morale across the board with effect sizes ranging from 2.31 per cent to 3.16 per
cent across different government organizations. Our second main finding is that tax morale is most
affected by the level of trust in government organizations that implement and deliver public goods
and services to the citizenry; i.e., trust in output government organizations has a stronger and more
robust positive association with tax morale than trust in input government organizations. Third,
we find that negative democratic transitions have a more positive impact on tax morale than
positive transitions. In addition, the interactive effects of trust in different government
organizations and democratic transitions unveil substantial heterogeneity in the tax morale
response.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. The second section reviews the literature
exploring the impact of trust in government on tax morale. In the third section we develop a
conceptual framework of how governments may elicit trust and ultimately affect individuals’
willingness to voluntarily comply with the tax laws. The fourth section describes the data and
empirical approach we employ. The fifth section presents and interprets our results, and the sixth
section concludes.
2. Literature Review
Tax morale is shortly defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Torgler, 2006). A
more inclusive definition is offered by Luttmer and Singhal (2014) who highlight five mechanisms
through which tax morale could influence individual tax compliance: intrinsic motivations,
reciprocity, peer effects and social influences, culture, and information.6 A consistent finding in
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This may not be an exhaustive list, of course. For example, Filippin et al. (2013) using survey data from Italy, also
identify stricter formal law enforcement as an institutional factor that can enhance tax morale.

4

the previous literature is that trust in government positively affects individuals’ willingness to
comply with the tax laws. In particular, higher trust in the country’s legal system, the government,
and the parliament, have all been found to increase individual tax morale (Torgler, 2003a, 2003b,
2005; Cummings et al., 2009; Cyan et al., 2016, 2017; Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler and
Schneider, 2007; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010) Other
factors such as upholding religious beliefs, support for democracy, and pride in one’s national
origin also have been found to influence tax morale in a positive way (Torgler, 2005b, 2006). In
this regard, Orviska and Hudson (2003), using information from the British Social Attitudes
Survey, find that law abidance and civic duty work to actually lower tax evasion (as one would
expect from higher tax morale).
Although these reported empirical findings strongly indicate that trusting government is
associated with higher willingness to comply with the tax laws, it is much less well-known what
is that government does to trigger taxpayers’ trust. Two main explanations on how governments
affect trust may be found in the literature. First, it has been theorized that governments may elicit
trust when they deliver what taxpayers demand. For instance, widespread support for the programs
provided by government legitimates government actions and may impose a social norm towards
paying taxes (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Voters supporting the winning party would
expect it to implement the policies they favor (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), which means that
government policies earn trust from those who support them and disappoint and lose trust from
those voters who oppose them (Citrin, 1974). At the same time, this suggest that individuals would
distrust those officials who implement policies they do not favor and, consequently, would not be
willing to comply with their tax obligations. Thus, overall, the link between meeting individual
policy preferences and tax compliance is a complex one.

5

A second explanation that has been suggested is that governments that are perceived as
being fair may elicit individual trust (Alm and Torgler, 2006). In this respect, experimental
evidence suggests that individuals are more compliant when they have a voice in how their taxes
are spent and vice-versa (Alm et al., 1993; Wahl et al., 2010; Casal et al., 2016; Drogalas et al.,
2018) and have a say in how tax enforcement should be done (Alm, 1999). Consistent with the
idea that democracy gives individuals an opportunity to get the public goods they desire
(Rohrschneider, 2005), taxpayers tend to be more compliant when they are given an outlet to
express their opinion about what policies should be adopted. For example, survey evidence from
Switzerland showed a positive relationship between direct democracy and taxpayer satisfaction
(Frey and Stutzer, 2005). Those findings complement earlier results that in cantons where direct
democratic rights were more developed, the average size of tax evasion was smaller (Pommerehne
and Weck-Hannemann, 1996, Torgler 2005a).7
3. Conceptual Framework
First, in order to understand which government actions elicit trust, and where in
government those actions are carried out, we separate government organizations into input and
output organizations (Rothstein, 2005). The input side of government is its political side; it
converts individual preferences into policies that will help produce, among other things, the goods
and services that individuals want government to provide. The output side fulfills an administrative
role of delivering the goods and services decided upon on the input side. Table B.1 in the Appendix
lists input, and output organizations of the government, which respectively include the government
or Parliament, and civil services, the courts, or the police.

7

More generally, the presence of referendum institutions could be another potential mechanism through which trust
is linked to tax morale (Hug and Spörri, 2011).
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Second, to assess how the interaction between trust and power affect tax we use democratic
transitions to proxy for substantial variation of trust and power of different government
organizations. One might expect differential effects of increased trust in input and output
organizations on tax morale in response to positive and negative democratic transitions. These
transitions are the result of significant shifts, either an attack on or a victory, in political rights and
civil liberties that are sufficiently large to cause a change of status in the country’s designation as
Free, Partially-free or Not Free in the Freedom House survey. Arguably, a positive democratic
transition which involves changes in input organizations of the government that may empower
individual citizens is more likely to spur higher tax morale between individuals with trust in input
as opposed to output organizations. Lab experiments suggest that allowing for voice on tax
contributions and distributions leads to higher tax morale (Casal et al., 2016). On the contrary, a
negative democratic transition that may be linked to a shift closer to ruling with an “iron fist” may
increase perceptions of the power of government organizations and, particularly, of output side
ones, which include tax authorities.
3.1. Input and Output Government Organizations
The input side of government is constituted by the political organizations of government –
the legislative and executive branches. Their members are elected to advance the policies favored
by the electorate who supported them. Therefore, the policies they advance may certainly favor
certain groups over others (Rothstein 2005).
The partisan character of input organizations makes it more challenging for them to elicit
widespread trust among taxpayers. For example, in Sweden people place higher trust in
government organizations whose members are not elected (e.g. public schools, health care system,

7

and the police) than in the representative organizations of democracy such as political parties or
parliaments (Rothstein, 2005).
Another obstacle with the input side of government as generator of trust stems from the
fact that voting does not necessarily ensure fair results. Madison (1788) observed this shortcoming
of democracy and underlined that individual freedoms are threatened not only by government
actions, but also by the decisions of majorities that might undermine minorities' freedoms. Levi
(1998) pointed out that the introduction of safeguards to protect minorities may reduce the danger
of a "dictatorship of the majority" at the expense of the majority’s resentment.
Consequently, for all the reasons above, it seems unlikely that input government
organizations would elicit from their actions a very high level of taxpayers' trust and tax morale.
Output organizations are in charge of delivering public goods and services to individuals
which are previously decided upon by the input institutions of government. Therefore, output
organizations are not concerned with what should be delivered, but instead with how those goods
and services are actually delivered. Building a relationship of trust between taxpayers and the tax
administration (an organization of the output side of government) has been seen as critical to
increase voluntary tax compliance (Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008).
Taxpayers are no longer seen as subordinates of the state, but instead more as partners of the tax
administration, that are more likely to willfully comply (Rothstein, 2005). When treating taxpayers
more as partners, tax authorities deliver good governance that is supportive of democratic
principles (Braithwaite, 2003).
3.2. Trust in and Power of Government Organizations and Tax Morale
The recent literature on trust in tax authorities and tax compliance highlights two elements.
One is the role that direct interaction between government officials and taxpayers may have in

8

eliciting voluntary tax compliance, and the second concerns how taxpayers are treated by
authorities. Direct contact between individuals is at the cornerstone of building a trust relationship
because it provides the parties with superior clues regarding the other side’s trustworthiness
(Ostrom, 1998). Taxpayers are likely to trust (or distrust) tax authorities depending on their
experiences dealing with them in direct interactions (Gangl et al., 2013). However, tax
administrations are not the only government institution taxpayers deal with. Since other institutions
of the output side of government also deliver governance consistent with democratic principles,
they may jointly influence individual willingness to comply with tax laws.
There is a broad consensus on how issues of fairness and legitimacy affect trust in
authorities in a variety of arenas impacting: (i) voluntary compliance with their norms and requests
(Levi, 1998; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Rothstein, 2005, 2009; Rothstein and Teorell 2008); (ii) tax
compliance (Frey and Feld, 2002; Murphy, 2004; Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; Feld and
Frey, 2007; (iii) law enforcement (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003); and (iv) cooperation with authorities
(De Cremer and Tyler, 2007).
Economists have started to explore whether procedural justice is a source of satisfaction
for individuals in the same way that consumption of goods and services increases individual
utility (Frey et al., 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2005). Obtaining satisfaction from receiving fair
treatment may be the reason behind the experimental finding that allowing taxpayers to vote
leads to increased tax compliance (Alm et al., 1993, 1999; Feld and Tyran, 2002; Wahl et al.,
2010).
In understanding where trust is created, we must note that individuals most likely do not
treat government institutions as a single monolithic entity. Rothstein and Stolle’s (2008) factor
analysis evaluating whether individuals trust all government institutions the same way revealed
9

that two dimensions of institutional trust emerge. Institutions belonging to the input side of
government such as parliaments, political parties, and government fall within the same dimension,
whereas institutions from the output side such as the police, the army, and legal institutions, load
on a different dimension. An additional analysis using Sweden’s SOM survey produced similar
results.
The arguments above strongly suggest that the kind of trust in government that would affect
tax morale is likely to come, at least more strongly, from the treatment received by individuals in
the output side of government. Other than affecting individual well-being, interaction with output
organizations also informs citizens on how government regards them (North, 1994).
We therefore pose the following hypotheses that will be empirically tested in the following
section:
H1: Individuals who trust government would show higher tax morale than those who do
not trust it
H2: Individuals who trust the output organizations of government would show even
stronger tax morale
H3: A positive (negative) democratic transition would be associated with high (low) tax
morale.
H4: Individuals with trust in input organizations of government in countries experiencing
a positive (negative) democratic transition would exhibit higher (lower) tax morale than those
individuals who trust output organizations under the same democratic transitions conditions.
4. Data and Empirical Approach
4.1. Data Sources

10

We employ survey information from all six waves of the World Values Survey (WVS),
which collects individuals’ opinions on a large array of topics, spanning two periods, 1981-85 and
1988-2014, and covering 92 countries, ranging from full-fledged democracies to one-party
governments (Inglehart et al., 2014).8 Coverage is uneven; only five countries appear in all six
WVS survey waves, while 30 countries appear in only one. As a result, our dataset should be
understood as pooled cross-sectional observations at the individual level from an unbalanced panel
of countries.
Differences in political systems may influence how individuals come to trust authorities.
Individuals appreciate the trust government places in them and in turn may become more willing
to comply with taxes (Alm et al., 1993; Wahl et al., 2010). Thus, higher tax compliance may be
associated with governance practices consistent with democratic principles (Braithwaite, 2003).
For these reasons we need to control for the differences in political regimes from full-fledged
democracies and other types of regimes.
To control for the different ways that governments interact with their citizens, we use the
Freedom in the World survey.9 The survey assesses a country’s level of political rights and civil
liberties enjoyed by their inhabitants. Each dimension generates a score from 1 to 7, with lower
values meaning higher degree of political and civil rights. The survey ranks annually most
countries in the world, and groups them as free countries (with scores from 1 up to 2.5), partiallyfree countries (with scores between 3 and 5.5, and between 3 and 5 beginning with the 2003 ratings
onwards), and not-free countries (with scores 5.5 and above). In the empirical analysis, we use this
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The WVS team controls the accuracy of surveys by providing the main questionnaire (in English) to each country
team which translates it into the local language(s). In turn, the local teams submit the local questionnaires to a
different translator who translates it back to English.
9
Freedom House, Country and Territory Ratings and Statuses 1973-2018:
https://freedomhouse.org/content/freedom-world-data-and-resources
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latter information in two different ways. First, these composite scores enter as continuous control
variables in standard logit regression models. Second, they are used to generate indicators of
democratic transition from free - in the parlance of the survey -, partially-free, or not free status—
see Table B.2 in the Appendix. That is, the positive democratic transition indicator is equal to one
when a country’s status on the Freedom in the World survey improves (from Not Free to Partiallyfree or Free, from Partially-free to Free) and zero, otherwise. Conversely, the negative democratic
transition indicator is equal to one when a country’s status deteriorates (from Free to Partially-free
or Not Free, from Partially-free to Not Free), and zero, otherwise. This allows us to exploit changes
in underlying political institution arrangements as identifying variation of the role of trust in
different government functions on tax morale. We believe this measure of political freedom sums
in the most holistic – yet arguably coarse – way how government policies affect individual attitudes
towards the government as a whole, including tax morale.
4.2. Model Selection
This subsection describes how we construct our dependent variable, tax morale, and our
key independent variables of trust in government and democratic transition, and the additional
control variables already well identified in the previous literature.
The question in the WVS that we use to generate our tax morale binary outcome variable
is:
“Please tell me whether you think cheating on taxes if you have a chance can always be justified,
never be justified, or something in between (1-10 scale: 1: never justifiable; 10: always
justifiable).”
We code tax morale into a binary variable that measures high tax morale taking the value
of one when cheating on taxes is never justifiable (WVS scale 1) and zero, otherwise (WVS scale
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2-10).10 This choice is motivated by the empirical distribution of the survey responses of the WVS’
tax morale variable and confirmed via a statistical test using a stereotype logit regression model
(Liu, 2014). Figure A.1 in the Appendix presents the histogram of the 10-point WVS scale of
responses to the survey question. The mass of survey responses (62.07%) is concentrated on the
extreme “cheating on taxes is never justifiable” making it a natural candidate to model it separately.
The remaining responses are fairly evenly distributed over the other nine possible values.
Respondents seem to differentiate between “cheating on taxes is never justifiable” and all other
responses. The stereotype logistic regression model allows us to formally test whether respondents
differentiate between the values of the 10-point scale based on the empirical distribution of the tax
morale variable. In the majority of statistical tests, survey responses 2 through 9 are statistically
indistinguishable.11 These findings make a strong case for coding individual WVS tax morale
survey responses into a binary variable.
Although the WVS is generally employed in the tax morale literature, it is not free of the
general shortcomings associated with self-reported answers. A prominent shortcoming is that
individuals’ answers to the question may not correlate with actual tax behavior; some individuals
may want to make up for past behavior by asserting high tax morale in survey responses. Several
papers (Cummings et al., 2009; Halla, 2012; Koumpias and Martinez-Vazquez, 2019) have shown
evidence of a causal link between tax morale and a some measure of tax compliance. Other issues
contemplated in the literature, such as the problems derived from using a single question to
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Typically, tax morale is coded into an ordered variable in four different categories. See, for example, Torgler
(2006) and Rodriguez-Justicia and Theilen (2018) but a binary approach has been preferred in other recent studies,
too (Doerrenberg and Peichl, 2018).
11
Each response value is represented by a scale parameter φ 1i, i=1,…,10. The parameter representing the extreme
responses “cheating on taxes is never justifiable” and “cheating on taxes is always justifiable” are denoted by φ _11
(corner constraint set equal to 1) and φ_19 (base outcome set equal to zero). We find very precise evidence that
respondents strongly distinguish between value 1 (corner constraint φ _11) and values 2 through 9 (φ_12,…,φ_19). In
addition, in the majority of tests assessing whether each one of the intermediate parameters φ_12,…,φ_19 is equal to
its following one (φ_12=φ_13,…,φ_18=φ_19), we fail to reject the hypothesis they are equal to each other.
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measure tax morale, are counter-balanced by the difficulties in assembling indexes because of the
correlation among components and deciding on the relative importance (weights) of each
component (Alm and Torgler, 2006).
Next, we discuss the variables used to test the proposition that government organizations
on the output side may be more salient in driving tax morale. The question in the WVS that asks
individuals how much they trust different government organizations reads:
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very
much confidence or none at all? (4-scale item, coded 1=a great deal… 4=none at all)”
We code trust in the different government organizations as indicator variables that take the
value of 1 when survey respondents have either “a great deal of confidence” or “quite a lot of
confidence” in the government organization at hand; zero, otherwise:
Trust in the Government. This independent variable is capturing individual trust in the
national government at the time of the survey. For brevity, we will, thereafter, refer to this inputside government organization as “government.” It is also the government organization with which
respondents are expected to be most familiar. We expect a positive sign between trust in the
government and tax morale.
Trust in the Civil Service. This variable measures individual trust in government
bureaucracies, which are in charge of service delivery in health, education, social services, and so
on. “Civil service” may not fully capture individual experience with the output side of
government;12 measures of trust in specific organizations (e.g. school system or social welfare)
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Rothstein and Stolle (2008) contended that trust in Civil Service may be considered as trust in the political
appointees populating the high ranks of state organizations, which would make it to be closer to input side
institutions.
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would be a better alternative, but they are not available.13 We expect a positive sign between trust
in civil services and tax morale.
Trust in Police. The role of this government organization is to protect individuals’ lives
and property. Police actions fall right into the output side of government. The expected sign of
the coefficient is positive.
Trust in the Courts. The relationship between the courts and the legal system, an outputside government organization, in eliciting individual tax morale has been explored in previous
studies and found to be empirically supported (Torgler 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004a; Torgler and
Murphy, 2005). One possible issue relates to the extent which individuals interact with the legal
system and courts. The same positive association is expected between trust in courts and tax
morale, albeit of potentially smaller magnitude due to less exposure of individuals to the courts as
opposed to civil services.
Trust in Parliament. Higher trust in legislatures has been found in the previous literature
to increase tax morale (Torgler 2003a, 2004a; Torgler and Murphy, 2005; Martinez-Vazquez and
Torgler, 2009). The interpretation of the variable is partially complicated by the fact that trust in
parliament may gauge not only trust in the institution but also trust in the incumbents, and therefore
survey responses may also express attitudes towards members of the parliament in the opposition
(Citrin, 1974). Trust in the parliament is expected to be positively correlated with tax morale but
a less pronounced effect is possible because respondents may also be expressing their attitudes
towards members of the parliament in the opposition.

13

Even if we had measures of individual trust from several output organizations, it could be difficult to ascertain
their relative relevance in shaping individual Tax Morale because of different country arrangements for different
functions. For example, healthcare in the U.S. is provided mainly by private providers whereas in many Western
European countries, Canada, and Japan, the arrangements include government organizations in varied degrees.
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We further exploit events of substantial changes in the political system that may provide
identifying variation in individual attitudes towards trust in government organizations. We do so
by creating an indicator of positive and negative democratic transition. Based on the Freedom
House information, the indicator of positive democratic transition takes the value of one when
countries become either free or partially-free from partially-free or not free; zero, otherwise. In an
analogous fashion, we generated an indicator of negative democratic transition when the status of
a country’s political system changes from free to partially-free or from partially-free to not free.
Individual support for democracy has been found in the previous literature to positively
affect tax morale (Torgler, 2003c, 2004b, 2005b; Torgler and Schneider, 2007). Moreover, the
availability of direct democratic practices such as referenda has been shown to increase tax morale
among Swiss taxpayers (Torgler, 2005a). However, Inglehart (2003) in examining the issue of
how to measure support for democracy noted that measures of overt support may be misleading
because a substantial proportion of democracy supporters also support non-democratic regime
types, even among those living in well-established democracies. Consequently, following Linde
(2012), we use a binary measure of democratic support gauging individuals’ rejection of nondemocratic regimes.
Finally, we include in our analysis a number of other predictors of tax morale identified in
the previous literature, including demographics such as age and gender, as well as information on
socio-economic status, such as income, marital status, educational attainment, and employment
status. We expect females, married and older respondents to exhibit higher tax morale than males,
singles, or younger individuals (Torgler, 2004c; Torgler, 2007a; Hug and Spörri, 2011; Cyan et
al., 2016). The educational attainment variable is measured in 9 scales which we recode into 4
binary variables of increasingly higher educational attainment: no or some education up to
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elementary school, vocational school, secondary and higher education. The evidence on the
relationship between educational attainment and tax morale is mixed with a number of studies
reporting either a positive (Torgler, 2005a, 2005b; Konrad and Qari, 2012; Rodriguez-Justicia and
Theilen, 2018) or a negative relationship (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010; Doerrenberg and
Peichl, 2013). The 10-scale income measure in the WVS has been documented to suffer from
measurement error and coverage problems such as inconsistencies across countries (Layard et al.,
2008). As a result, the same income scale corresponds to substantially different income intervals
in different countries, which poses analytical challenges for cross-country analyses (Donnelly and
Pop-Eleches, 2018).
Despite these limitations, some researchers have simply used the original income variable
in the WVS and interpreted it as income deciles (Ingehart et al., 2008). Donnelly and Pop-Eleches
(2018) apply a series of corrections to a subset of WVS country surveys to construct and make
publicly available a measure of income at purchasing power parity (or exchange rate) in 2005 US
dollars.14 Other solutions offered in the literature include collapsing the 10-scale variable into
quintiles (Solt, 2008); or creating three categories of income that approximates terciles (Alesina
and Giuliano, 2011). We follow this latter approach and construct low, middle, and high-income
indicators that correspond to scales 1-3, 4-7, and 8-10, respectively. Respondents in the lowest
income tercile are more likely to report high tax morale relative to those in the middle tercile, while
those in the top tercile may exhibit lower tax morale due to the heavier tax burden they bear
(Torgler, 2002a).
With regards to employment status, salaried individuals who are likely to be subject to tax
withholding are also expected to have higher tax morale than those self-employed. Religiosity is

14

However, the dataset spans 137 out of 241 countries from the first five waves of the WVS and, thus, does not
sufficiently overlap with our study sample in time and space.
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suggestive of individual involvement with formal religion, gauged by attendance at religious
services, has been found to be an important determinant of tax morale (Torgler, 2003a, 2005a,
2006; Alm and Torgler, 2006, Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Torgler and Martinez-Vazquez, 2009).
National pride has also been linked to tax morale in previous studies (Torgler, 2005b; Torgler and
Schneider, 2004; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009; Konrad and Qari, 2012). Similarly, to our
construction of support for democracy, we code the qualitative responses to national pride and
religiosity as indicators that take the value of one when respondent have the most positive attitudes
(“Religion is very important in life”, “very proud”).
4.3. Logit Regression Models
In order to estimate the impact of trust in institutions on tax morale we specify and estimate
several empirical models. First, we employ a logit regression model that allows us to test our first
two hypotheses: H1: Trust in government is associated with higher tax morale; and H2: Trust in
output-side organizations of the government is more strongly associated with tax morale than trust
in input-side organizations of the government.
The logit model we estimate is given by:
1,…,4

8,…,13

𝐻𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑙

𝑙

+ 𝑰(𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗 )𝜷𝟏𝟒 + 𝑰(𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑡 )𝜷𝟏𝟓 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1)
where our dependent variable 𝐻𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is High Tax Morale, measuring individual i’s willingness to
comply with tax laws in country 𝑗 at WVS wave 𝑡 based on whether she believes cheating on taxes
is “never justifiable”. We include a vector of five variables, ∑1,…,4
𝛽𝑙 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 which collects
𝑙
all four key independent variables with information about respondents’ trust in different
government functions in both the input and the output side.
Besides the “Trust in Government” variables of interest we control for several other
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determinants of tax morale as discussed above: age, indicators of religiosity, national pride, being
female, being single, low- and high-income terciles and employment status. It should be noted
though that the support for democracy survey question was not asked to more than half of the total
respondents in all six waves of the WVS. Thus, to avoid discarding more than half of the
observations, we only include this variable in a supplemental specification.
Finally, we include dummy variables to control for country 𝑗 and WVS-wave 𝑡 fixed
effects in vectors 𝑰(𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗 ) and 𝑰(𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑡 ) and cluster standard errors at the country level.
4.4. Democratic Transition Treatment Effects Model
Next, we present a supplemental empirical strategy to test hypotheses H3 and H4. Using a
comparative case study framework, we exploit instances of democratic transition to estimate the
relationship of trust in government organizations and tax morale after periods of heightened
political transition processes.
2,…,6

1,…,5

𝐻𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑘 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑙

𝑘
6,…,10

∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝜌𝑘 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑇𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘
7,…,15

∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜹𝟏𝟔 𝑰(𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗 ) + 𝜹𝟏𝟕 𝑰(𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑡 )
𝑙

+ 𝜉𝑖𝑡 (2)
where our dependent variable 𝐻𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is High Tax Morale, measuring individual i’s willingness to
comply with tax laws in country 𝑗 at WVS wave 𝑡 when perceiving cheating on taxes as “never
justifiable”.
One should be careful in their interpretation given that they involve interaction terms of
indicator variables. Specifically, 𝛿1 and 𝛾1 denote the overall effect of a positive and a negative
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democratic transition on tax morale in the absence of trust in government, respectively. Parameters
𝛿𝑙 , 𝑙 = 2, … ,6 capture the correlation between trust in a government function of the five we
consider and tax morale in the absence of democratic transition. The incremental effects of a
positive and a negative democratic transition and trust in government relative to trust in
government in the absence of any transition are equal to 𝛿1 + 𝜌𝑘 , 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 1, … ,5 and 𝛾1 +
𝜌𝑘 , 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 6, … ,10, respectively. Similarly, the incremental effects relative to a positive
or a negative democratic transition with lack of trust in any government function are equal to 𝛿𝑙 +
𝜌𝑘 , 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 1, … ,5 and 𝛿𝑙 + 𝜌𝑘 , 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 6, … ,10, respectively. Finally, the effects
of a positive and negative transition given trust in government to lack of trust in a period of no
democratic transition is given by 𝛿1 + 𝛿𝑙 + 𝜌𝑘 , 𝑙 = 2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 1, … ,5 and 𝛾1 + 𝛿𝑙 + 𝜌𝑘 , 𝑙 =
2, … ,6, 𝑘 = 6, … ,10, respectively.
As in the logit regression models, we control for the same determinants of tax morale
collected in vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in equation (1), as well as support for democracy, religiosity, and national
pride.
5. Results
First, we present the results of the logit regression model (equation 1) in Table 1. Those
with national pride have a much higher probability of reporting high tax morale, holding all other
variables at their means. The impact of religiosity is also positive, but smaller. This latter echoes
Dalton’s (1996) observation that religious affiliation is losing its relevance in providing
individuals with guidance about civil-political issues. Females are more likely to report high tax
morale compared to males and older individuals are more likely to report tax morale than
younger ones. In the same fashion, retirees are also positively associated with higher tax morale.
But, as the coefficients for the different measures of employment status indicate, the determining
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factor is not being employed or retired but rather the nature of employment; self-employed
respondents show less tax morale relative to salaried workers. The same holds for part-time
workers who share some common employment characteristics with the self-employed. In
addition, those with no or very low educational attainment (up to elementary school) are
significantly less likely to report high tax morale in all specifications but those in columns (4)
and (6), which supports the similar findings by McGee and Ross (2012). The least wealthy
respondents (those in the lowest income tercile) have higher tax morale relative to respondents in
the second tercile.
Table 1: Logit Regression Model Coefficient Estimates
VARIABLES
Trust in Government

(1)
Government
0.123***
(0.0288)

Trust in Civil
Services

(2)
Civil Services

(3)
Parliament

(4)
Courts

(5)
Police

0.116***
(0.0231)

Trust in Parliament

0.100***
(0.0267)

Trust in Courts

0.117***
(0.0234)

Trust in Police
Political Rights
Civil Liberties
National Pride
Religiosity
Age
Female
Elementary Ed
Vocational Ed
Higher Ed
Part-time
Self-employed
Retired
Homemaker

0.0470
(0.110)
0.0603
(0.152)
0.368***
(0.0433)
0.231***
(0.0302)
0.0121***
(0.000864)
0.149***
(0.0232)
-0.0770*
(0.0349)
-0.0402
(0.0260)
0.0363
(0.0369)
-0.0595*
(0.0288)
-0.0623*
(0.0276)
0.117***
(0.0296)
0.000788

0.00797
(0.0905)
0.0748
(0.121)
0.381***
(0.0430)
0.237***
(0.0309)
0.0126***
(0.000893)
0.147***
(0.0214)
-0.100*
(0.0406)
-0.0502
(0.0302)
0.0327
(0.0361)
-0.0680*
(0.0290)
-0.0686*
(0.0282)
0.108***
(0.0274)
-0.0185

0.00523
(0.0915)
0.0818
(0.122)
0.378***
(0.0417)
0.232***
(0.0309)
0.0127***
(0.000907)
0.151***
(0.0213)
-0.0873*
(0.0406)
-0.0436
(0.0296)
0.0352
(0.0361)
-0.0660*
(0.0277)
-0.0722**
(0.0270)
0.103***
(0.0280)
-0.00818

-0.0916
(0.105)
0.240
(0.146)
0.372***
(0.0446)
0.241***
(0.0325)
0.0122***
(0.00101)
0.148***
(0.0228)
-0.0528
(0.0390)
-0.0437
(0.0330)
0.0401
(0.0405)
-0.0591*
(0.0276)
-0.0757**
(0.0285)
0.124***
(0.0301)
-0.00740

0.138***
(0.0331)
0.0112
(0.0904)
0.0775
(0.122)
0.373***
(0.0421)
0.232***
(0.0302)
0.0125***
(0.000898)
0.152***
(0.0212)
-0.0827*
(0.0387)
-0.0477
(0.0285)
0.0303
(0.0355)
-0.0681*
(0.0271)
-0.0738**
(0.0263)
0.100***
(0.0275)
-0.0136

(6)
All
0.0525
(0.0269)
0.0712**
(0.0261)
-0.0116
(0.0248)
0.0361
(0.0226)
0.0613
(0.0370)
-0.0616
(0.132)
0.256
(0.188)
0.352***
(0.0500)
0.238***
(0.0331)
0.0116***
(0.000977)
0.141***
(0.0262)
-0.0650
(0.0355)
-0.0402
(0.0301)
0.0525
(0.0431)
-0.0470
(0.0308)
-0.0602*
(0.0289)
0.150***
(0.0314)
0.0118
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Student
Unemployed
Part-time
Single
Low Income
High Income
Constant
Observations

(0.0285)
0.0257
(0.0281)
-0.0174
(0.0385)
-0.0344
(0.0870)
-0.0772***
(0.0178)
0.104***
(0.0297)
-0.0726
(0.0446)
-0.335
(0.282)
232,012

(0.0304)
0.0214
(0.0257)
-0.0328
(0.0382)
-0.0564
(0.0802)
-0.0826***
(0.0170)
0.114***
(0.0276)
-0.0723
(0.0457)
-0.309*
(0.145)
242,049

(0.0305)
0.0239
(0.0250)
-0.0301
(0.0398)
-0.0533
(0.0794)
-0.0751***
(0.0170)
0.108***
(0.0274)
-0.0704
(0.0460)
-0.281
(0.147)
242,112

(0.0333)
0.0158
(0.0278)
-0.0468
(0.0475)
-0.0732
(0.0874)
-0.0757***
(0.0173)
0.130***
(0.0303)
-0.0642
(0.0522)
-0.229
(0.160)
204,016

(0.0298)
0.0177
(0.0251)
-0.0331
(0.0385)
-0.0515
(0.0865)
-0.0726***
(0.0164)
0.113***
(0.0279)
-0.0673
(0.0456)
-0.335*
(0.153)
248,970

(0.0317)
0.0355
(0.0301)
-0.0217
(0.0493)
-0.0360
(0.0942)
-0.0799***
(0.0178)
0.127***
(0.0341)
-0.0688
(0.0531)
-0.338
(0.291)
176,915

Notes: Education, employment and income values in reference to secondary education, full-time employment and medium income. Standard
errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.

* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p< .001

Possible explanations include the fact that low-income individuals often pay very few taxes
yet understand the importance of taxation to fund public services or social assistance they may rely
on; alternatively, low-income individuals are averse to risk relative to medium- or high-income
respondents. We cannot distinguish any statistically significant differences in tax morale between
medium- and high-income respondents, confirming prior findings in the literature (Torgler,
2007).15
Logit coefficients report the change in the z-score of the dependent variable of a one-unit
change in the independent variable, holding other explanatory variables at pre-determined values.
To make those estimates easier to interpret, Table 2 reports the marginal effects measuring the
change in the probability of reporting tax morale of a unit change in trust in the different
government organizations, holding all other explanatory variables constant at their means. The
estimated coefficients should be interpreted as the partial derivative of the independent variables
of interest; namely, the independent variables measuring respondents’ trust in different
government organization.

15

Including support for democracy as a regressor, we recover a large, positive and statistically significant
association between individual support for democracy and tax morale.
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Table 2: Conditional Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Model
VARIABLES
Trust in
Government

(1)
Government
0.0283***

(2)
Civil Services

(3)
Parliament

(4)
Courts

(5)
Police

(0.00662)
Trust in Civil
Services

(0.00641)
0.0169**

0.0267***
(0.00533)

Trust in Parliament
Trust in Courts

0.0278***
(0.00553)

Trust in Police
Observations

(0.00621)
-0.00276
(0.00589)
0.00858
(0.00537)

0.0231***
(0.00614)

232,012

242,049

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.

*

(6)
All
0.0125

242,112
p<.05

**

p<.01

***

204,016

0.0316***
(0.00760)
248,970

0.0146
(0.00879)
176,915

p< .001

The first five columns present coefficient estimates for trust in each of the four different
government organizations we consider plus general trust in government. They are all positive and
statistically significant. Thus, in the interpretation of our results we focus on the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients to investigate any differential impact among them. For our first independent
variable of interest, a one unit increase in Trust in Government (the indicator variable’s value
turning from zero to one) increases the probability of reporting high tax morale by about 2.83 per
cent. Columns (2) and (3) report lower coefficients for the impact Trust in Civil Services and the
Parliament, at 2.67 and 2.31 per cent, respectively. Possible reasons for those results in the first
case may be the lack of specificity for the type of Civil Service case (it may have different
meanings for different people). In the case of the Parliament, as discussed above, there are reasons
to expect that Trust in this institution may not be as strongly related to tax morale because
individuals may associate parliament with incumbent members from the opposition. However, we
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find strong associations between trust in courts and police at 2.78 and 3.16 per cent, respectively.16
In column (6), we report the marginal effects of trust in every government organization we consider
based on a joint specification. This allows us to discern the relative importance that trust in
different government organizations has on reporting high tax morale. Only trust in civil services
increase the probability of reporting high tax morale by 1.69 per cent. The estimated coefficients
of trust in all other government organizations are not statistically different from zero at the 5 per
cent level of statistical significance. Summarizing, we find that, indeed, respondents who generally
have higher trust in government organizations are linked to higher tax morale and that trust in
output-side government organizations, indeed, is a stronger predictor of tax morale than trust in
input-side organizations.
Table 3 shows the conditional marginal effects of the indicators of positive and negative
democratic transition, trust in government organizations, as well as their interaction terms. The
coefficient estimates of the full regression specified in equation (2) are omitted from the
presentation to focus our attention to the marginal effects of the key independent variables.
Table 3: Conditional Marginal Effects of Democratic Transition Treatment-Effects
Model
VARIABLES
Positive DT
Trust in Government
Trust in Government*Pos DT
Trust in Civil Services
Trust in Civil Services*Pos DT
Trust in Parliament

(1)
Governmen
t
0.0351
(0.0405)
0.0307***
(0.00610)
-0.0259
(0.0218)

(2)
Civil
Services
0.0264
(0.0289)

(3)
Parliament

(4)
Courts

(5)
Police

(6)
All

0.0257
(0.0286)

0.00482
(0.0728)

0.0371
(0.0316)

0.102
(0.0807)
0.00908
(0.00625)
0.0718
(0.0395)
0.0143*
(0.00580)
0.0387
(0.0465)
0.00251
(0.00603)

0.0277***
(0.00470)
-0.0117
(0.0321)
0.0272***
(0.00560)

16

Several other considerations may be behind the strong results for trust in police. For example, results from
behavioral experiments indicate that direct, face-to-face communication is superior to other forms of interaction in
promoting trust and cooperation (Ostrom, 2000).
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Trust in Parliament*Pos DT

-0.0221
(0.0299)

Trust in Courts

0.0306***
(0.00511)
0.00815
(0.00885)

Trust in Courts*Pos DT
Trust in Police
Trust in Police*Pos DT
Negative DT
Trust in Government*Neg DT

0.0869*
(0.0415)
-0.00813
(0.0247)

Trust in Civil Services*Neg
DT

0.0821
(0.0455)

0.0934*
(0.0387)

0.129**
(0.0463)

0.0372***
(0.00731)
-0.0525**
(0.0172)
0.0993*
(0.0389)

0.00355
(0.0249)

Trust in Parliament*Neg DT

-0.0286
(0.0154)

Trust in Courts*Neg DT

-0.0238
(0.0172)

Trust in Police*Neg DT
Observations

232,012

242,049

242,112

204,016

-0.0414*
(0.0200)
248,970

-0.0378
(0.0246)
0.0119*
(0.00564)
-0.0554***
(0.0136)
0.0164
(0.00955)
0.00286
(0.0302)
0.143**
(0.0524)
0.0324*
(0.0157)
0.0222
(0.0201)
-0.0377**
(0.0118)
-0.0266*
(0.0133)
-0.0231
(0.0161)
176,915

Notes: “Pos DT” and “Neg DT” denote positive and negative democratic transitions, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the country level in
parentheses.

* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p< .001

The reported coefficients of the trust in government organizations are quantitatively and
qualitatively very similar to those in Table 2. We find a large, positive and statistically significant
correlation between tax morale and trust in all five government organizations for the regression
models in which they enter singularly, in columns (1) through (5). In fact, the effect size is larger
than for the estimates in Table 2. The novel results in Table 3 include the effects of a positive and
a negative democratic transition on tax morale and the interactive effects of trust in different
government organizations on tax morale in periods of democratic transition. The event of a positive
democratic transition has a null effect on the probability of reporting high tax morale across all
specifications in Table 3.17 However, a negative transition does have a positive and statistically

17

Torgler (2003c, 2007b) finds survey respondents from a Central or Eastern European country to report an
increased tax morale relative to respondents from former Soviet countries, perhaps reflecting that the former
countries had been more successful in “controlling the decay of tax morale during the transformation process”. Note
that those findings implicitly confirm the absence of any (positive) improvements in tax morale in the transition to
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significant impact. In fact, the magnitude of the estimated effects is large enough to dominate the
incremental effect of the interaction terms that has the opposite sign.
The estimated interaction terms reveal an interesting relationship between tax morale and
trust in different government organizations in the wake of a positive democratic transition. The
joint interpretation of the coefficient estimates in column (6) indicate that respondents with trust
in the police or the courts during a period of either democratic transition are associated with
lower tax morale than either those who lack trust during the transition or those who trust these
organizations in periods of political stability. If trust in the police or the courts is an indication of
respondents’ preference for a strong rule of law, the negative effect on tax morale may be
interpreted as a statement of protest to the likely social instability associated with periods of
democratic transition.
6. Conclusions
In recent years, scholars have shifted their focus to ask what makes people willing to
comply with taxes beyond the incentives provided by audit probabilities and potential fines which
were emphasized in the classical Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model. Considerable research has
now been conducted verifying the important role of tax morale in tax compliance behavior
(Luttmer and Singhal, 2014). This in turn has led to asking the question of what shapes tax morale.
In this paper we have argued that trust in government and therefore the willingness to comply with
tax laws is affected by the way citizens are treated when interacting with government institutions
in the regular delivery of public goods and services. The evidence available from other fields
strongly supports the argument that trust plays a fundamental role in fostering cooperation, and

democratic market economies, just different tax morale reduction rates. In addition, in Torgler (2003c, 2007b) all
treated countries experience a positive democratic transition, which is not the case in our sample.
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thus provides independent support for the hypothesized mechanism for building tax morale. We
empirically test the propositions that individuals who trust government are more likely to exhibit
higher tax morale and that trust in the output organizations of government in particular is even
more likely to increase tax morale. For the empirical analysis we use data from 92 countries
covering the 1981-2014 period in six successive waves of the WVS. Our results suggest that tax
morale is influenced by individual trust in government organizations; and, particularly so, by trust
in output-side government organizations, the entities with which individuals are more likely to
interact.
From a tax policy standpoint, the results in this paper are consistent with the
recommendation in the tax compliance literature that building a relationship of trust and
cooperation between taxpayers and tax authorities is necessary to elicit voluntary tax compliance
(e.g. Braithwaite, 2003; Alm and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Furthermore, the results in this paper
suggest the need to expand that recommendation to all the output organizations of government
(and not only where taxpayers meet tax authorities). Finally, the positive influence of a negative
democratic transition on tax morale highlights the importance of the “enforced compliance”
channel of the slippery slope framework. Assuming that a negative democratic transition goes in
tandem with a “cops and robbers” attitude towards taxpayers, our findings suggest that even this
approach may still yield increased tax morale despite its limitations in comparison to the “service
and clients” approach (Kirchler et al., 2008).
More generally, tax administration reform should be just one part of a broader reform in
the public sector to instill trust in government. If individuals are at the mercy of government agents
that demand bribes in exchange for goods and services individuals are entitled to get, impose
sanctions that may not be appealed, trust in government is severely undermined and citizens cannot
27

be expected to voluntarily comply with taxes. Building a professional and responsive bureaucracy
may be a good step in building trust in government and in fellow citizens (Rothstein, 2000;
Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). We find evidence of all those beneficial effects in this paper.
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Appendix A. Figures
Figure A.1: WVS 10-point Tax Morale Response Histogram
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Appendix B. Tables
Table B.1: Input-side and Output-side Organizations of the Government
Input-Side
Output-Side
National Government
Civil Services (e.g. tax administration)
Acting Parliament
Justice and Courts
Police
Table B.2: Freedom House Country Ratings
Free Countries

Andorra
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Cyprus
Czech Republic
East Germany
Estonia
Finland

France
Netherlands
Germany
New Zealand
Ghana
Norway
Hungary
Peru (1999-2004, 2010-14)
India (1999-2014)
Philippines (1999-2004)
Indonesia (2005-09)
Poland
Italy
Romania
Japan
Serbia
Latvia
Serbia & Montenegro
Lithuania
Slovakia
Mali
Slovenia
Mexico (1999-2009)
South Africa (1994-2014)
Partially Free Countries
El Salvador
Mexico (1981-1998, 20102014)

South Korea (1989-2014)
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Trinidad and Tobago
UK
Ukraine (2005-09)
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela (1994-98)
West Germany

Argentina (1981-84)
Armenia
Bangladesh

Ethiopia
Georgia
Guatemala

Moldova
Morocco
Nigeria (1989-98, 2010-14)

Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey

Belarus (1989-93)
Bosnia

India (1989-98)
Indonesia (1999-2004)

North Macedonia
Pakistan (2010-14)

Uganda
Ukraine (1994-98, 201014)

Burkina Faso
Colombia
Croatia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador

Jordan (1999-2009)
Philippines (2010-14)
Kuwait
Russia (1989-98)
Kyrgyzstan (2010-14)
Singapore
Lebanon
South Africa (1981-93)
Malaysia
South Korea (1981-84)
Not Free Countries
Iran
Libya
Iraq
Nigeria (1994-98)
Jordan (2010-14)
Pakistan (1999-2004)

Venezuela (1999-2004)

Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan (19992004)

Zimbabwe

Albania

Algeria
Azerbaijan
Belarus (1994-1998,
2010-14)
China
Egypt

Russia (2005-14)
Rwanda

Tanzania

Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Yemen
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